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Proposals to transfer complaints Panels to the Commission for Social 




Abstract: This article considers proposed changes to the social services complaints 
procedure. The Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 makes 
provision for complaints Panels to be taken away from local authorities. The suggestion is 
that in future the Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) should be responsible for 
running all Panels. We argue that this proposal is not grounded in a satisfactory rationale, is 
not the best solution to any concerns about Panels and could lead to problems for all 
concerned: complainants, Panel members, complaints officers and the CSCI itself. 
 
Keywords: Social services; Complaints Panels; CSCI; Consultation proposals. 
 
Introduction  
A crucially important policy change, which directly affects local authorities and the 
provision of social services, was contained in a Department of Health (DoH) 
publication, NHS Complaints Reform - Making Things Right, published in February 
2003. This document was based on an earlier consultation document, Reforming the 
NHS Complaints Procedure: a listening document, which was issued for 
consideration by Health Authorities in September 2001. The reasons lying behind the 
NHS documents are well known. There had been considerable dissatisfaction with 
complaints procedures in the Health Service.  
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Subsequently, a new Health Service complaints procedure has been drawn up. Under 
this new procedure, where complainants are not satisfied with attempts to bring about 
resolution of their complaint at local level they will have the right to a new second 
stage of the procedure. The job of reviewing complaints has been removed from local 
NHS bodies and given to an independent organisation, the Healthcare Commission. 
Legislation has been introduced, the Health and Social Care (Community Health and 
Standards) Act 2003, and the details of the legal framework for the new procedure is 
set out in Regulations published by the DoH in July 2004. 
 
However, tucked away in the original consultation document in 2001 were proposals 
that will now have a major impact on all social services complaints procedures. The 
proposal was to remove the responsibility of local authorities for the Panel (final) 
stage of the social services complaints process. Despite serious concerns being raised 
at the time about this proposal, plans went ahead and it is now proposed in three 
consultation documents - Learning from Complaints, issued by the DoH, Getting the 
Best from Complaints, issued by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES), and 
An Independent Voice, issued by the Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) - 
that Panels be transferred to the CSCI.  
 
The original underlying rationale for including social services complaints in the NHS 
reform plans was the desirability of making complaints which cross service 
boundaries between health and social services easier to handle. Thus the initial reason 
for amending the social services procedure had nothing to do with either the running 
or success of that procedure. It might therefore be assumed that, as the new NHS 
reforms do not, in fact, make detailed provision for such complaints, the plans 
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surrounding social services would be abandoned. However, this has not proved to be 
the case.  
 
Early objections to the proposal 
Back in 2001 there was no consultation with local authorities before the changes were 
proposed in the NHS document. On the proposals being published, objectors, who 
included complaints officers, Independent Persons and elected members, could not 
see any clear advantage to the changes. It appeared that the local authority process 
had been swept up in NHS reforms without sufficient thought being given to the 
consequences. On the issue of cross-border complaints, the reason for including social 
services in the first place, objectors argued that better ways of dealing with these 
could be achieved by other means, including regulations setting a framework for 
information-sharing and joint investigations. 
 
Local authority social services complaints procedures had also been the subject of 
consultation by the DoH and Listening to People - A Consultation on Improving 
Social Services Complaints Procedures came to a conclusion in June 2000. However, 
this document did not contain either a basis for, or a recommendation for, the change 
now proposed. Objectors therefore argued that there was no evidence, or other firm 
basis, in the DoH publications or elsewhere that the change would improve local 
authority handling of complaints. There was certainly no research basis for the 
change, although the DoH was aware of some very detailed research on the social 
services Panel process that was then being undertaken (see Ph.D by Katy Ferris, 
forthcoming) and it was suggested by the objectors that, if changes were to be made, 
then proper research should inform such changes. 
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Unfortunately, objections to the proposed new procedure failed to bring a halt to the 
plans and the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 
not only amends the Health Service procedure but section 114 makes provision for 
review Panels to be removed from local authorities. Section 114 states: 
… (2) Regulations under subsection (1) may provide for a complaint to be 
considered by one or more of the following- 
(a) the local authority in respect of whose functions the complaint is 
made; 
(b) the CSCI; 
(c) an independent panel established under the regulations; 
(d) any other person or body. 
 
It can be seen that the Act does not simply transfer the functions of the Panel stage to 
the CSCI and therefore there is no necessity to do so, but subsequent consultation has 
proceeded on the basis that all review Panels will henceforth be run by the CSCI. 
 
Variations in practice 
One of the stated aims of the newly formed CSCI is to improve complaints handling. 
There is detailed research evidence (Ferris, forthcoming) that there are considerable 
variations in practice between different local authorities in the way that complaints are 
handled and in the way that Panels operate. It is also a commonsense observation, 
since the Regulations (the Representations Procedure (Children) Regulations 1991, SI 
No. 894) and Guidance (the Children Act Guidance, Volume 3 Family Placements, 
chapter 10 and Volume 4 Residential Care, chapter 5) surrounding the complaints 
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procedure are very lacking in detail. Some local authorities have struggled to know 
how best to operate the procedure in view of the lack of clear direction and it is 
evident that some sort of national standards, with which all local authorities should 
comply, are required.  
 
Complaints are a vital function and should be taken very seriously. Not only do 
complainants themselves potentially benefit from bringing a complaint, but so too do 
other service users. One of the rationales for a complaints procedure is that it should 
be used to inform policies, practices and procedures. Recommendations from 
investigations into complaints and from Panel hearings, when of general application, 
should give rise to a better service. Therefore, if the system is not functioning as well 
as it should then reform is called for. However, it is argued here that the solution 
being proposed, transferring Panels to the CSCI, is not the appropriate response to the 
problem. 
 
Concerns about the basis for change 
 
The rationale for change 
The proposed changes to the system contained in the three consultation documents do 
not explain why the system should alter. There is no longer any attempted justification 
that it is to make cross-boundary complaints easier to handle. However, both the DoH 




The DoH consultation paper makes an absolutely fundamental statement in paragraph 
1.1.2, which explains and justifies the proposals for change. This statement is repeated 
by the CSCI at [25] under the heading ‘What’s wrong with the current procedure?’ 
However, we argue that this fundamental statement is inaccurate and that it does not 
provide a good basis on which to make decisions. Paragraph 1.1.2 states: 
Concerns about the membership, independence and decision making of Social 
Services Complaints Review Panels were highlighted in a Department of 
Health consultation exercise, Listening to People. 
 
When this statement is analysed it can be found that it simply does not represent the 
true situation. 
 
(a) Listening to People 
Nowhere in the document Listening to People are there any critical statements about 
the quality of Panels. In fact, very little is said about Panels at all. The mere fact that 
they exist is referred to in paragraphs 3.2, 3.5, 6.9 (where it is a suggested 
requirement that the Chair should always be an independent person, which in practice 
is the case) and 7.7. Section 10 is the only part of the document that contains more 
than a passing reference to Panels. Paragraph 10.1 does express concern about the 
implementation of Panel decisions and is followed with comments about how better 
to monitor implementation in paragraphs 10.2 and 10.3, but these paragraphs are not 
critical of the Panels themselves. Then, in paragraph 10.4, practically the reverse of 
the alleged concern is written, as the document states: 
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the Ombudsman noted that Review Panels are not always made the best use 
of. From their knowledge of a case they may be best placed to propose 
suitable remedies. 
 
Thus it can be seen that the alleged negative comments about Panels simply do not 
exist in Listening to People. 
 
(b) The Local Government Ombudsman 
A vital source of material as to whether there are truly ‘concerns about the 
membership, independence and decision making’ of Panels is, of course, the Local 
Government Ombudsman (LGO), since, if a complainant is dissatisfied with the 
outcome of a Panel, he has the right to have his complaint referred to the LGO. 
However, the LGOs do not express such concerns, either in their feedback to 
Listening to People or in their Annual Reports. As noted above, they made a positive 
comment about Panels in paragraph 10.4, which then continued: 
The Ombudsman recommends that Directors of Social Services should ensure 
that Review Panels should in future propose the remedies they think 
appropriate. 
In other words, the LGO, far from criticising Panels, were actually placing their faith 
in them.  
 
From an examination of LGO Annual Reports, one can see that very little has been 
said about Panels since the inception of the complaints procedure in 1991. In the 
Annual Reports for 1997/98 and 1998/99, one of the LGOs did make the same 
criticism two years running. This was that ‘some Review Panels had not adequately 
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analysed what harm the complainants had suffered as a result of fault and 
recommended an appropriate remedy’. A different LGO, in 2000/01, found 
‘investigation had revealed major flaws in the support given to Panels’ in one local 
authority, but went on to say that the authority had agreed to fundamentally overhaul 
its arrangements. That is the sum total of criticism of Panels in all of the Annual 
Reports from 1991 to the present day. It cannot seriously be argued that these very 
minor criticisms justify a radical overhaul of an entire system. 
 
(c) Case law 
The comment about the lack of independence of Panel members is not explained in 
either the DoH or CSCI documents, but the overwhelming likelihood is that this 
comment is directed at the use of local authority elected members on Panels. It is 
undoubtedly the case that elected members are widely used as the other two members 
on Panels. In her research, Ferris found this to be the practice in a large majority of 
local authorities. Of the 47 authorities she surveyed, 23 authorities had an 
independent Chair plus two elected members and a further 15 authorities used elected 
members as one of the two wing members. The argument surrounding elected 
members is that not only are they are not independent people but they also have a 
vested interest in the outcome of Panels. Ultimately, these members take decisions 
about the budget of their local authority. Therefore, it is argued, they have an interest 
in preserving funds and will take decisions according to their own financial priorities. 
 
The fact that elected members sit on Panels did not, in fact, give rise to any adverse 
comment in Listening to People. However, the negative view of their use could stem 
from the decision in R (On the application of Christopher Beeson) v the Secretary of 
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State for Health [2002] EWCA Civ 1812. In Beeson the local authority had alleged 
that Mr Beeson had deliberately deprived himself of his assets, his house, in order to 
avoid paying for his residential accommodation. This decision was challenged by Mr 
Beeson’s son, to whom the house had been transferred, who invoked the statutory 
complaints procedure. The complaint went to stage 3 of the procedure, the Panel 
stage. Sitting on the Panel was an independent Chair and two local authority elected 
members. The Panel found that Mr Beeson had deprived himself of assets for the 
purpose of avoiding payment for accommodation and, as a consequence, the appeal 
against placing a legal charge on the property was not upheld. This finding was 
confirmed by the Director of Social Services, the decision-maker at stage three. This 
decision was then challenged in judicial review. 
 
At first instance Richards J, in the Administrative Court ([2001] EWHC Admin 986), 
quashed the decision of Dorset County Council. He did so on the basis that Article 6 
of the European Convention (the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950) applied to the Panel and that, where there 
is only one truly independent member of the Panel, the complaints procedure was 
inadequate to secure the requisite degree of independence and impartiality required 
by Article 6. However, on appeal the Court of Appeal held that the Panel process, 
culminating in recommendations to the Director who takes the decision and coupled 
with the availability of judicial review, does meet the Article 6 standard.  
 
The Court of Appeal commented on two particular matters of importance for the 
purposes of Panels in general. One was the matter of the financial considerations of 
the elected members. The Court said:  
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In this present case we have seen no evidence that the Panel could not or 
would not arrive at a fair and reasonable recommendation. It is by no means to 
be assumed that the two Council members would have entertained, even 
subconsciously, a disposition towards the protection of Council funds. (at 
[30]) 
 
The comment by the Court of Appeal that, without evidence, there was no reason to 
suppose even a subconscious bias is of central importance. It is this that makes it 
acceptable to use elected members without fear of being immediately challenged 
either for breach of Article 6 or for breach of the rules of natural justice. 
 
The second and even more important comment by the Court of Appeal concerned the 
use of ‘non-independent’ people on complaints Panels. The Court recognised that 
elected members have to take decisions which involve competing interests and thus 
competing access to funding. On this the Court said: 
In our judgment the scheme here is exactly of the kind where the first 
decisions are properly confided (sic) within the public body having 
responsibility for the scheme's administration. Difficult issues of judgment 
will arise; and difficult balances will have to be struck. We acknowledge that 
in this particular case issues of credibility arose for decision, and were 
important to the decision. It is plain however that that circumstance will not of 
itself require, as the price of compliance with the Art 6 standard, the addition 
of a strictly independent adjudicative process empowered to re-decide the 
facts. (At [33])  
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Subsequently the decision in Beeson has been confirmed by the House of Lords in 
Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] 2 AC 430. The 
Begum case did not involve a complaints Panel, but was concerned with a homeless 
claimant who rejected an offer of accommodation. An officer of the local authority 
reviewed the offer and concluded that it had been reasonable. At this point the 
claimant appealed the decision to the County Court under the Housing Act 1996, 
section 204. The relevance of this decision to the Beeson case is that once again the 
application of Article 6 was called into question. Lord Bingham commented:  
The importance of this case is that it exposes more clearly than any earlier 
case has done, the interrelation between the Article 6(1) concept of civil rights 
on the one hand and the Article 6(1) requirement of ‘an independent and 
impartial tribunal’ on the other.” (At [5]) 
 
The House of Lords were clear that, whilst there was no reason to doubt the 
impartiality of the reviewing officer, ‘I do not see how she can sensibly be said to be 
independent … She was an officer of the very Council which was alleged to owe the 
duty … The want of independence is manifest.’ (Lord Millett at [96]). However, 
assuming, without deciding, that Runa Begum’s ‘civil right’ was engaged, and 
therefore that Article 6 was applicable, such a decision might properly be made by a 
tribunal which did not itself possess the necessary independence to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 6(1). This was acceptable provided measures were in place to 
safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and the decision was subject to ultimate 
judicial control by a court with jurisdiction to deal with the case as its nature required.  
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As a result of these two decisions, it can be seen that the courts have established that 
it is fully within the remit of local authorities to set up Panels with varied 
membership, including elected members, and that this is a perfectly sensible, and 
indeed correct, way for them to proceed. The approach of the courts can also be 
backed up by Ferris’s research. She found that a very strong message being reported 
back to Complaints Officers was that complainants really wanted to have an elected 
member on the Panel. They wanted members to hear what had gone on, as they 
identified them as someone who could learn from the experience and ‘do something.’  
 
Concerns about the proposed scheme  
 
In January 2005 CSCI published feedback on its consultation document (see 
Commission for Social Care Inspection, 12th January 2005, Complaints Review 
Service (CRS) Implementation Progress Report). It is recorded that there were 140 
responses to the consultation document and it is evident from the Report that 
considerable concern and reservations have been widely expressed about the proposed 
changes concerning Panels. Paragraph [11] of the Report notes that strong 
reservations had been expressed to CSCI about the fundamental premise and basis for 
the transfer of the review function, as well as other aspects of the change, and the 
Report lists a number of issues giving rise to concern. Paragraph [13] lists more 
specific matters of concern, or need for clarification, relating to the particular 
proposals for delivery of the new function. These concerns are now considered below. 
 
(a) Difficulties the complainant will face 
We detailed above critical commentary on the basis for change, which is recognised 
in the CSCI feedback. However, there are also a number of important objections that 
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can be raised about the mechanics of the proposed scheme. The first objection is that 
the new system will give rise to difficulties on the part of complainants, one of which 
is actually highlighted in all of the consultation documents. Currently, if a 
complainant is still dissatisfied after the Panel hearing and Director’s decision, he has 
the right to complain to the LGO, who may or may not take up the case. However, 
under the new system, where the CSCI are running Panels, if a complainant is 
dissatisfied he will still have the right to refer his substantive complaint about the 
local authority’s actions and decisions to the LGO, but if he is dissatisfied with the 
actions of the Panel itself, that will then be subject to independent scrutiny by the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA). This would mean that 
instead of the current system, whereby a complainant has a maximum of two bodies 
to deal with when making a complaint - the local authority and the LGO - under the 
new system the complainant (who will fairly typically be a child struggling with 
making a complaint, a vulnerable adult or an elderly person) may now have to 
contact, first of all, the local authority, then ask to proceed to the CSCI, then possibly 
make two further complaints to both the LGO and the PCA. Quite apart from the 
obvious difficulty for the complainant of disentangling complaints which are due to 
actions or decisions of the Panel from complaints about the actions of the local 
authority, as was said in the LGO Annual Report of 2001/02 by one of the LGOs: ‘It 
is absurd that a citizen might need to complain to two Ombudsmen to allow all 
elements of a complaint to be properly investigated’. 
 
It is obviously the case that the LGO are the ones who have the most experience and 
expertise in dealing with social services complaints and that the LGO are more local 
to the complainant than the PCA. It would seem sensible to confine all issues relating 
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to complaints to those with this expertise, but there is a further serious drawback for 
the complainant under the proposed scheme. Throughout the consultation, there is an 
emphasis on timescales and on the need to resolve matters relatively quickly. 
However, introducing different bodies into the process will inevitably increase the 
time taken for resolution or exhaustion of the complaints procedure, to the detriment 
of the complainant. 
 
Another change which will impact adversely on complainants is the suggestion that 
CSCI will have the option of informing them no further action will be taken. 
Currently, all complainants can, if they wish, take their complaint to Panel. That is 
their right. Under the new scheme, the declared object of the CSCI is ‘resolution for 
the complainant by a focus upon their desired outcomes.’(at [41]). Therefore, they 
state, where those outcomes cannot reasonably be achieved and where local action 
has been appropriate, the CSCI can decide that no further action be taken. This has 
the potential to be in breach of the rules of natural justice, by deciding in advance of a 
hearing what the outcome will be (Glynn v Keele University [1971] 2 All ER 89; R v 
Marylebone Magistrates Court ex parte Perry 156 JP 696, 7 February 1992). Also, 
some complainants understandably like to have their ‘day in court’. Even if the 
ultimate outcome is the same as at the investigation stage, many complainants will 




Another fundamental objection to the proposed change concerns the issue of 
independence; which is, of course, one of the reasons given for change. Under the 
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new scheme, the CSCI will have a multi-functional role. The main duties of the CSCI 
are listed in the consultation document at [3] and are: to register services that meet 
national minimum standards; to carry out inspections of all social care organisations, 
public, private and voluntary, measured against national standards; to carry out 
inspections of local social services authorities; to publish an annual report to 
Parliament; to validate all published performance assessment statistics on social care; 
and to publish the star ratings for social services authorities. Reviewing complaints 
will be a new function and, as the CSCI consultation document states at [4], ‘with 1.6 
million people using local authority social services every year, this additional 
responsibility will represent a significant area of work for the Commission’. The 
document suggests that when a complaint comes in there will be four alternative 
courses of action: the CSCI could set up a Panel, could mount their own investigation, 
could refer straightaway to the LGO or could judge that there should be no further 
action as the local response is satisfactory. 
 
The CSCI document at [58] stipulates the circumstances when mounting an 
investigation may occur. It says it ‘may commonly include situations where the 
presenting facts of the complaint give strong cause for concern about either the 
substantive issue of complaint, or local complaints process.’ Objections can be raised 
to this. Firstly, it has the potential to be a waste of time and expense if the reason for 
investigation is the substantive issue, as it could be a repeat of what has gone before. 
However, more importantly from the point of view of independence, in either of the 
two examples given, the CSCI will be prejudging the case and not having the benefit 
of a balanced Panel of three. Furthermore, there is the potential that by virtue of 
commissioning an investigation the CSCI will inevitably be compromising its own 
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independence and raising a conflict of interest. The way in which this could arise 
would be if there are unresolved issues stemming from its investigation. In these 
circumstances, the CSCI will be reviewing its own decisions; those it has made itself 
in relation to the investigation and its findings. 
 
On top of the above, the CSCI propose that when running a Panel the Panel members, 
having drawn up their findings and conclusions and, in conjunction with the CSCI 
representative at Panel, drafted their recommendations, should then e-mail the 
recommendations to the Complaints Review Service (CRS) of the CSCI. The 
recommendations will then be subjected to tiered scrutiny by a relevant case manager, 
who will make any comments and observations and pass them on to the relevant team 
leader for approval or amendment. The team leader, where necessary, will liaise with 
the Chair to agree any changes. Finally, the document will be submitted to the Head 
of Complaints & Service Improvement for formal approval and signing off. 
 
The first thing that can be noted about the process described above is that, once again, 
an element of delay is introduced into the procedure, contrary to the CSCIs own 
emphasis on timescales. More significantly, the net result of all this is that the CSCI 
can be seen as having the role of enforcer, registrar, investigator and reviewer of its 
own actions and decisions. All of these different roles are simply not compatible. The 
proposals for Panels are completely unwarranted. Currently, Panels are not interfered 
with in this way. They are responsible for sending their findings and 
recommendations to the Director of Social Services without checking by any third 
party. There is no justification given as to why they should be subject to this scrutiny 
by members of the CSCI complaints team. The proposal is that membership of Panels 
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will be the result of the recruitment of suitable people by the CRS. If they are suitable, 
surely they, having been present at Panel and having heard all of the evidence and 
arguments, should be left to make and sign off their own decisions? 
 
(c) Risk of increased litigation 
Following sign-off, the proposal is that the CRS will issue the Panel’s 
recommendations to both the complainant and the local authority. The authority will 
then make its decision. Thereafter, any subsequent monitoring and implementation of 
any recommendations will be undertaken by the CRS. Thus, unlike at present, there is 
no possibility of dialogue between the Panel Chair and the decision-maker. The Chair 
also loses any control over implementation of panel recommendations. This gives rise 
to the potential for increased litigation and, thus, expense. Currently, the Chair can 
talk through any recommendations about which the Director of Social Services is 
doubtful. Wording can be amended, in the light of these discussions, to ensure that 
what is perhaps designed as a response to an individual complaint does not tie the 
authority’s hands in an unintended or unacceptable way. However, if the opportunity 
to discuss the ramifications of a recommendation is lost this could lead to Directors 
refusing to accept recommendations. This is likely to lead to reference to at least the 
LGO and may well lead to litigation in the courts by an aggrieved complainant.  
 
That a recommendation might be too widely worded is not a demonstration of poor 
quality on the part of Panels. Any person not intimately involved in the actual running 
of a procedure may inadvertently make a recommendation without appreciating the 
full extent of the ramifications of that recommendation. That dialogue on these 
matters can be very helpful can be demonstrated by considering case law. The courts 
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themselves have, on occasion, rapidly clarified their approach after a decision has led 
to alarm on the part of local authorities because of its potential implications. For 
example, after the House of Lords ruling in Re C (Interim Care Order: Residential 
Assessment) [1997] AC 489 that the court did have power, in interim care 
proceedings, to order a residential assessment under the Children Act, section 38(6), 
there were justifiable fears on the part of local authorities about the possible cost 
implications if the decision were to be applied in too widespread a fashion. However, 
subsequently the courts were quick to reassure local authorities that the decision was 
not intended to be interpreted and applied too widely, and provided clarity to the 
effect that the resource implications of such an order, both human and financial, 
should be borne in mind and that such applications should not be encouraged (Re W 
(Assessment of Child) [1998] 2 FLR 130; Re M (Residential Assessment Directions) 
[1998] 2 FLR 371; Re B (Psychiatric Therapy for Parents) [1999] 1 FLR 701).  
 
(d) Legal advice 
Although the complaints process ‘should be uncomplicated and accessible to those 
who might wish to use it’ (Guidance, Vol 4, at 5.36) and the aim is to try to keep the 
Panel procedure as informal as is reasonably practicable and consonant with the 
procedure (see Guidance, Vol 4, at 5.46), inevitably some complaints do involve legal 
issues. A number of cases, for example Beeson (above), which have started out as 
complaints have progressed through to proceedings in court (Williams, 2002). While 
Panels are not routinely faced with questions which might involve legal interpretation, 
at the same time it is not rare for a legal issue to crop up. Currently, if a Panel requests 
assistance a legal advisor may be appointed to advise the Panel. It is up to the local 
authority as to whom they appoint as adviser. Some authorities will always use in-
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house lawyers and some will go outside. However, whichever is used, just as in court 
proceedings the lawyer’s role is to advise the client (here the Panel), not to be an 
advocate for either the local authority or the complainant. Panels, of course, are not 
the only ones who might consider that they require legal assistance. Such assistance 
can also be sought by the complainant. Complainants are not entitled to legal aid for 
the purposes of bringing a complaint and, of course, Panel hearings are meant to be 
informal in nature. Because of this, it is unusual for complainants to bring a legal 
representative to Panel. The local authority, if requiring advice, has access to its own 
lawyers, who will normally brief the member of staff attending the Panel in advance. 
Again, it is very unusual for the authority to send any sort of legal representative to 
the actual hearing. Overall, it is in a minority of cases that lawyers are present at a 
Panel hearing. However, on occasion it is necessary and extremely helpful to have a 
lawyer present. 
 
Access to legal assistance at Panel will change under the proposed procedure. Instead 
of the Panel being able to ask for an advisor to attend, the CRS ‘will take appropriate 
legal advice in advance on any contentious issues upon which the Panel may need to 
be advised and informed’ (at [121]). However, there is no intention that the CSCI will 
provide a legal representative on the day. Complainants who reasonably wish to bring 
a legal representative will continue to be able to do so. No mention is made in the 
document of the position of the local authority.  
 
The declared position of the CSCI of having ‘no intention to provide a legal 
representative’ seems unnecessary and to have the potential to give rise to problems. 
Whilst with most complaints it may appear to be clear what, if any, legal issues are 
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liable to arise, Panel hearings should be organised on the basis that if it is clear in 
advance there is a contentious legal matter then advice may be necessary on the day. 
This is especially so in view of the recognition in the CSCI document that a 
complainant might want to bring a legal advisor to Panel and that this could put the 
Panel in the position that they are faced with a legal argument that they are simply 
unable to cope with or respond to. It is very important for Panels to be in a position to 
ask the right questions and to be given an accurate interpretation of the law. 
 
(e) Funding  
It is a trite observation that most local authority social services departments are very 
short of funding. Social services are a ‘Cinderella’ service, rarely attracting 
sympathetic coverage in the media. In contrast to health and education, governments 
do not announce with delight their intention of increasing spending on social services. 
In light of this, the question of the financing of the new system is of crucial 
importance. The implication of what is proposed is that the system will cost a 
substantial amount more than is currently the case, yet no reference is made in any of 
the documents to any extra funding being provided to local authorities.  
 
Under the new proposals, there will be no reduction in the work of Complaints 
Officers that could lead to savings. Indeed, there is likely to be an increase in such 
work. Complaints Officers will still be required to attend Panel hearings and, on top 
of this, with the implementation of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 more areas of 
complaint are now to be covered by the complaints procedure. No longer will it be 
confined to complaints under Part III of the Children Act; certain sections in Parts IV 
and V will also be brought within the remit of the procedure. Additionally, adoption 
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complaints, which were previously not covered, now will be. Complaints Officers will 
also be responsible for assisting children in finding advocates when they make a 
complaint. 
 
Elected members will no longer be used on Panels, but local authority funds will be 
top-sliced in some way to pay for Panels. This will be an extra expense for the 
authority, which currently does not have to pay for councillor Panel members. It is 
also curious that elected members are being ditched from the process. In the CSCI 
proposals, when outlining membership of Panels it is stated that the ‘wing’ 
independent persons on the Panel will provide ‘a regional and/or local knowledge 
base’. Surely this is exactly what elected members currently provide. 
 
With the proposals for the CSCI to undertake a review in certain cases, there is an 
obvious potential for duplication of the work of the Complaints Unit. There is also a 
confusion between the roles of the CSCI and that of the LGO, who may undertake an 
investigation if a complaint is successfully referred to them. All of this will inevitably 
impact on the local authority, which will end up bearing the cost of these extra 
investigations. 
 
(f) Confidentiality  
A major issue for some complainants is that of confidentiality. Currently, many 
complainants are anxious that their complaints should not be seen by anybody other 
than those who are strictly necessary to the procedure. There is, of course, a duty of 
confidentiality on all complaints staff, investigators and Panel members. With the 
introduction of the CSCI, many more people than is currently the case will now have 
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access to the complaint. This will result not just in more people knowing about an 
individual’s complaint, but also gives rise to attendant fears of breaches of 
confidentiality and introduces what could be argued as an embedded breach of a 
person’s confidentiality. Currently, within both social services and complaints units, 
information is only shared on a ‘need to know’ basis. However, the proposed scheme 
includes a case manager, team leader and head of complaints at the CSCI who will all 
have access to a person’s complaint. There should, surely, be some strong justification 
for expanding the need to know principle in this way, yet none is given in the 
document. It is simply stated that this is what will happen. 
 
Conclusion  
Even at this late stage, there is no necessity to transfer Panels to the CSCI. Section 
114 of the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 does 
not transfer Panels to the CSCI, but is simply an enabling section which provides for a 
number of alternatives. In particular, the reference to both ‘(c) an independent panel 
established under the regulations’ and ‘(d) any other person or body’ leaves open the 
possibility of leaving Panels under the control of the local authority.  
 
It would be perfectly easy to introduce new regulations about the composition and 
running of Panels without taking drastic steps. Perhaps the most obvious suggestion 
would be to make it a requirement that membership of the Panels should consist of at 
least two independent people, with only one elected local authority member as a wing 
member. This would go a very long way towards satisfying the reasons given for 
introducing change. It would also ensure that vital local knowledge of what is 
happening at Panels is maintained. Moreover, it would be considerably cheaper and 
 23
easier to administer and would mean the continuation of dialogue between Chairs and 
Directors of social services. 
 
It is clear that the CSCI have, rightly, got a hugely important role in monitoring the 
performance of local authority social services. Should it take over the role of running 
Panels, there will be no independent body to ensure that this function is carried out 
properly. Surely this is what CSCI should be doing, not getting involved in running 
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